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Loss OF CONSORTIUM-TEXAS SUPREME
COURT DECLINES TO RECOGNIZE A
PARENT'S Loss OF CONSORTIUM
CLAIM RESULTING FROM A
NON-FATAL INJURY TO CHILD
Angela R. Lilly
N the recent case Roberts v. Williamson, the Texas Supreme Court
refused to recognize a parent's right to recover for loss of consortium
resulting from serious, non-fatal injuries to a child.1 In reaching this
decision, the court created an anomaly in the law, reached a conclusion
that did not logically follow from precedent, and left a real loss uncom-
pensated in order to draw a line.2 Furthermore, the court's reasoning in
support of its decision to draw a line rather than recognize this claim is
unpersuasive in light of the fact that the court could have both recognized
the claim and drawn the line limiting recovery by secondary victims of
negligent activity.
As a result of complications after her birth, Courtnie Williamson exper-
ienced respiratory distress. Because treating physicians placed her on a
respirator that was not functioning correctly, Courtnie did not receive ox-
ygen for several minutes. Additionally, Dr. Roberts, the consulting pedi-
atrician, did not administer sodium bicarbonate as advised by another
physician for several hours. Subsequently, Dr. Roberts arranged to trans-
fer Courtnie to a better-equipped hospital.3 Courtnie now has a perma-
nent shunt in her skull to drain the fluid and requires braces to walk. In
addition, she is mentally retarded, behaves antisocially, and suffers from
partial paralysis on one side of her body as a result of her brain injury.
Courtnie's parents, individually and on behalf of Courtnie, sued Dr. Rob-
erts, the hospital, and other treating physicians, contending that the mal-
functioning ventilator and the delays in administering sodium
bicarbonate and in transferring Courtnie to another hospital proximately
caused Courtnie's injuries.4
1. 111 S.W.3d 113, 115 (Tex. 2003).
2. See id. at 133.
3. Id. at 115.
4. Id.
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Only the claims against the on-call physician and Dr. Roberts pro-
ceeded to trial since the claims against the hospital and another doctor
were settled. The jury determined that Dr. Roberts was fifteen percent
responsible for Courtnie's injuries and that the on-call physician was not
responsible at all. The jury awarded damages to the Williamsons in the
amount of $75,000 for past loss of filial consortium and one dollar for
future loss of consortium. The trial court rendered judgment on the ver-
dict and ordered Dr. Roberts to pay fifteen percent of the award with no
deductions for the settlements reached with the hospital and other physi-
cian. Additionally, the trial court awarded an ad litem fee that was di-
vided between Dr. Roberts and the Williamsons. 5
Dr. Roberts appealed, arguing that Texas does not recognize a claim
for a parent's loss of consortium caused by non-fatal injuries to a child,
that the expert witness was not qualified to testify regarding the cause of
Courtnie's injuries, that there was no evidence to support the jury's
award of past and future medical expenses, and that the trial court erred
in not applying a settlement credit before calculating Dr. Roberts' por-
tion of the damages.6 The Williamsons appealed only the half of the ad
litem fees that the trial court ordered them to pay. The court of appeals
affirmed the trial court's award of damages against Dr. Roberts but re-
versed the trial court's division of the ad litem fees and ordered Dr. Rob-
erts to pay the entire amount of the ad litem fees.7 The Texas Supreme
Court, consolidating separate appeals from Dr. Roberts and the William-
sons, reversed only the court of appeals judgment pertaining to the par-
ents' loss of consortium claim.8 The Texas Supreme Court held in
Roberts v. Williamson that Texas does not recognize a parent's right to
recover damages for loss of filial consortium resulting from a child's non-
fatal injuries.9
Loss of consortium was originally limited under Texas law such that a
wife could not recover for loss of her husband's consortium. 10 The Texas
Supreme Court recognized in Whittlesey v. Miller that "the emotional in-
terests of the marriage relationship are as worthy of protection from neg-
ligent invasion as other legally protected interests."" Thus, the court
held that either spouse could recover for loss of consortium resulting
from a negligent injury to the other spouse. 12 Five years later, the Texas
Supreme Court in Sanchez v. Schindler recognized that the common-law
principle limiting a parent's damages after the death of a child to the
pecuniary value of the child's services and financial contributions, minus
the cost of the child's care, support, and education, was "antiquated and
5. Id. at 115-16.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 114-15.
9. Id. at 120.
10. See Garrett v. Reno Oil Co., 271 S.W.2d 764, 768 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1954, writ ref d n.r.e.) (declining to recognize a wife's claim for loss of consortium).




inequitable.' 1 3 Instead of viewing the child as an economic asset, the
court recognized that the parent's loss upon the child's death is the loss of
the child's love, advice, comfort, companionship, and society. Because
injuries to the familial relationship are significant and worthy of compen-
sation, the plaintiff was allowed to recover both for the loss of her child's
companionship and society and for the mental anguish she suffered as a
result of the child's death. 14 Two years later, the court permitted children
to recover for the loss of companionship caused by their parent's death. 15
Next, the court in Reagan v. Vaughn determined that a child could re-
cover for the loss of consortium suffered when the parent was severely
injured by a third party.16 In reaching this decision, the court emphasized
the importance of the parent-child relationship and the need for judicial
protection of this relationship. 17 Additionally, the court refused to limit
the right of recovery to minor children.' 8
The court in Roberts v. Williamson declines to recognize a parent's
claim for loss of consortium because imposing liability for these damages
will not produce either fair compensation or benefits of deterrence, which
the court recognizes as fundamental purposes of the tort system. 19 Addi-
tionally, the court finds that the difficulty in measuring intangible dam-
ages to secondary victims outweighs the need to compensate deserving
victims. 20 Furthermore, the court decides that it must draw a line for fear
that extending loss of consortium in this context "could logically lead to
the recognition of such rights in other non-dependent relatives or even in
close friends, given appropriate facts."'21 Ultimately, the court concludes
that the interests of children and spouses deserve greater protection than
the interests of parents because of the dependence present in relation-
ships between spouses and between children and their parents.22 The
court states that:
Although parents customarily enjoy the consortium of their children,
in the ordinary course of events a parent does not depend on a child's
companionship, love, support, guidance, and nurture in the same way
and to the same degree that a husband depends on his wife, a wife
depends on her husband, or a minor or disabled adult child depends
on his or her parent. 23
Justice Jefferson, joined by Justice O'Neill and Justice Schneider, dis-
sented, arguing that the majority reached the wrong decision in this case
13. 651 S.W.2d 249, 251 (Tex. 1983).
14. Id. at 251-52.
15. Cavnar v. Quality Control Parking, Inc., 696 S.W.2d 549, 551 (Tex. 1985).
16. 804 S.W.2d 463, 467 (Tex. 1990).
17. Id. at 466.
18. Id.
19. Roberts v. Williamson, 111 S.W.3d 113, 118 (Tex. 2003).
20. Id. at 119.
21. Id.





because the majority's conclusion diverges from existing precedent and
creates an anomaly in the law. 24 In the line of cases expanding loss of
consortium, the court continually emphasized the importance of familial
relationships and recognized that injuries to familial relationships are
compensable. 25 By declining to recognize a parent's loss of consortium
arising from injuries to a child, the court denies recovery for a loss that
the court in previous decisions has concluded is "real, significant, and
worthy of compensation. '26 Justice Jefferson believes that the court com-
mitted itself in Reagan v. Vaughn to the proposition that the parent-child
relationship is worthy of "special protection"; thus, the court should be
constrained by stare decisis since the court cannot show that Reagan has
become unworkable or that the law has changed significantly such that
loss of consortium claims are obsolete.27
As a result of this decision, the Texas Supreme Court has created an
anomaly in the law. Under the Texas Wrongful Death statute, the surviv-
ing parents, spouse, and children may bring an action.28 Only two of
these three plaintiff groups may recover damages for loss of consortium
suffered as a result of non-fatal injuries. Thus, the majority's decision
"relegates parents to second-class status and reneges on the [c]ourt's ear-
lier promise to protect the familial relationship as a whole. '29 The court
rationalizes the inconsistency in allowing parents to recover for loss of
filial consortium upon a child's death but not upon a child's non-fatal
injury with the fact that the child's cause of action remains in cases where
the child is injured but does not die. If the child has a cause of action,
"there is no need to recognize actions by other family members to pre-
vent the tortfeasor from escaping liability."'30 According to the majority's
reasoning, recovery of consortium damages by spouses and children, as
previously recognized by this court, would not be warranted since the
primary victims' causes of action remain when the primary victim suffers
non-fatal injuries. 31 The majority's argument is further weakened by the
fact that under wrongful death statutes the survivor of the decedent may
recover, on behalf of the estate, for the victim's medical expenses, funeral
expenses, and damages for pain and suffering prior to the decedent's
death, in addition to the survivor's damages for loss of consortium. 32
Thus, in essence, the survivors may recover for loss of consortium, and
the decedent's estate may recover the same types of damages that an in-
24. Id. at 125 (Jefferson, J., dissenting).
25. See Reagan v. Vaughn, 804 S.W.2d 463, 466 (Tex. 1990); Cavnar v. Quality Control
Parking, Inc., 696 S.W.2d 549, 551 (Tex. 1985); Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249, 252
(Tex. 1983); Whittlesey v. Miller, 572 S.W.2d 665, 668 (Tex. 1978).
26. Roberts, 111 S.W.3d at 128 (Jefferson, J., dissenting).
27. Id. at 133 (Jefferson, J., dissenting).
28. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.004(b) (Vernon 2003).
29. Roberts, 111 S.W.3d at 131-32 (Jefferson, J., dissenting).
30. Id. at 120.
31. Id. at 131 (Jefferson, J., dissenting).
32. See Reben v. Ely, 705 P.2d 1360, 1363 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985) (pointing out the
fallacy in arguing that double recovery can occur with consortium claims resulting from
personal injury but not with consortium claims resulting from death).
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jured victim may recover. Therefore, the fact that the primary victim's
claim remains is not a persuasive explanation for refusing parents the
right to recover for the loss they suffer when their child is seriously
injured.
The court's concern over the difficulty in measuring intangible losses to
secondary victims 33 does not justify their refusal to recognize the parent's
claim. The court said in Whittlesey v. Miller that loss of spousal consor-
tium is not too indirect to be compensated because the loss of compan-
ionship, emotional support, and love are "real, direct, and personal
losses."'34 The court acknowledged in Sanchez v. Schindler both that tort
recovery is allowed for equally intangible injuries such as pain and suffer-
ing and that the judicial system has "adequate safeguards" to ensure that
victims are compensated in a fair and just manner.35
The fact that parents are not dependent upon children in the same way
that children are dependent upon the parents does not rationalize the
court's decision.36 While parents are generally not dependent upon chil-
dren, dependence is not a primary element of loss of consortium. In the
marital context, the Texas Supreme Court has defined consortium as the
"mutual right of the husband and wife to that affection, solace, comfort,
companionship, society, assistance, and sexual relations necessary to a
successful marriage. '37 In a parent-child context, the Texas Supreme
Court allowed a child to recover for the "loss of the parent's love, affec-
tion, protection, emotional support, services, companionship, care, and
society" that she suffered as a result of her father's serious injury.38 Fur-
thermore, the court indicated that the child's dependence on the parent
was not a main reason for allowing the child's claim for loss of parental
consortium by declining to limit the right of recovery to minor children. 39
When a child suffers a severe, non-fatal injury, the parents can lose the
child's love, affection, companionship, services, and society. Thus, par-
ents suffer a real loss that should be compensable under tort law even
though the parents are not dependent upon the child.
While the court believes that recognizing the parent's claim in this case
could lead to loss of consortium claims by other relatives or even close
friends, the court could have recognized the parent's loss of filial consor-
tium claim but limited loss of consortium to spousal relationships and
parent-child relationships. The court has drawn this line in previous cases
by refusing to recognize either a stepparent's or a sibling's loss of consor-
tium claim.40 Additionally, the court had "little difficulty" in Reagan v.
Vaughn limiting recovery to the parent-child relationship in response to
33. See Roberts, 111 S.W.3d at 119.
34. 572 S.W.2d 665, 667 (Tex. 1978).
35. 651 S.W.2d 249, 253 (Tex. 1983).
36. See Roberts, 111 S.W.3d at 117.
37. Whittlesey, 572 S.W.2d at 666.
38. Reagan v. Vaughn, 804 S.W.2d 463, 467 (Tex. 1990).
39. See id. at 466.
40. Ford Motor Co. v. Miles, 967 S.W.2d 377, 380 (Tex. 1998).
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respondent's contention that recognition of a child's claim for loss of pa-
rental consortium would have a "snowball effect" leading to recognition
of claims by siblings, grandparents, and close friends. 41 Furthermore, the
court could have recognized the cause of action and provided factors that
juries should consider in assessing damages for loss of filial consortium as
the court did in Reagan v. Vaughn.42
As a result of this decision, the Texas Supreme Court has left a real loss
uncompensated by not allowing parents to bring a derivative claim for
loss of consortium damages against a third party who tortiously injured
their child. Paradoxically, the parents can bring such a claim if the tor-
tious action results in the death of the child.43 The majority in Roberts
identifies the fundamental purposes of the tort system as "deter[ring]
wrongful conduct, shift[ing] losses to responsible parties, and fairly com-
pensat[ing] deserving victims."' 44 While recognizing the parent's claim
may not deter wrongful conduct because the parents are secondary vic-
tims, recognizing the parent's claim would without question shift the loss
to the responsible party and fairly compensate deserving victims. In prior
cases, the court recognized the importance of familial relationships and
recognized that damages could be recovered for the tortious injury to
these relationships. 45 In Sanchez, the court specifically recognized that
the real loss suffered by a parent upon a child's death is the "loss of love,
advice, comfort, companionship and society."'46 Previously, the court al-
lowed recovery by a spouse for loss of consortium resulting from a non-
fatal injury to the other spouse and acknowledged that nonfatal injury to
a spouse can result in a "real, direct, and personal loss[ I" to the other
spouse.47 When faced with the issue of whether to allow a child to re-
cover for loss of a parent's consortium resulting from non-fatal injuries to
the parent, the court was "hard pressed to say that a serious, permanent
and disabling injury to a parent does not potentially visit upon the child
an equally serious deprivation" as that which occurs when a spouse suf-
fers loss of spousal consortium as a result of non-fatal injuries to the other
spouse.48 By holding that parents may not recover for loss of filial con-
sortium resulting from a child's non-fatal injuries, the court is allowing
injuries that they have previously recognized as real and compensable to
remain uncompensated.
41. Reagan, 804 S.W.2d at 466.
42. See id. at 467 (providing factors such as severity of the injury to the parent and
nature of the child's relationship with the parent for juries to use in assessing damages for
loss of parental consortium).
43. TEX. CiV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.004(b) (Vernon 2003).
44. Roberts v. Williamson, 111 S.W.3d 113, 118 (Tex. 2003).
45. See Reagan, 804 S.W.2d at 466; Cavnar v. Quality Control Parking, Inc., 696
S.W.2d 549, 551 (Tex. 1985); Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249, 252 (Tex. 1983); Whit-
tlesey v. Miller, 572 S.W.2d 665, 668 (Tex. 1978).
46. Sanchez, 651 S.W.2d at 251.
47. Whittlesey, 572 S.W.2d at 667.
48. Reagan, 804 S.W.2d at 466.
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While limiting recovery by secondary victims of tortious activity is nec-
essary to prevent the ripple effect of the injury from expanding too far
outward, the court could have both recognized the loss that a parent suf-
fers when a child is severely injured and limited recovery by secondary
victims based on the relationship to the injured party.49 The court's deci-
sion to draw the line in this case and refuse to recognize a parent's right
to recover for loss of filial consortium is not warranted given the fact that
the court has allowed recovery for loss of consortium by spouses and by
children whose parents were injured. In addition, the court has drawn
lines in previous cases to limit this ripple effect by refusing recovery to
stepparents and siblings and by limiting recovery to the parent-child rela-
tionship. 50 The court has previously recognized that familial relationships
are important enough to warrant judicial protection; however, the court is
unwilling to follow its previous line of cases. Thus, the court leaves the
real loss suffered by parents of a seriously injured child uncompensated.
49. See Roberts, 111 S.W.3d at 119 (discussing the fact that once courts have fairly
compensated the primary victim, they should be more troubled about the difficulties in
measuring intangible losses to secondary victims).
50. See Ford Motor Co. v. Miles, 967 S.W.2d 377, 380 (Tex. 1998); Reagan, 804 S.W.2d
at 466.
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